Criminal Law - Assault with an Unloaded Firearm by S., J. M.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 6 | Number 2
Symposium Issue: The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1943-1944 Term
May 1945
Criminal Law - Assault with an Unloaded Firearm
J. M. S.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
J. M. S., Criminal Law - Assault with an Unloaded Firearm, 6 La. L. Rev. (1945)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol6/iss2/14
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Louisiana courts have usually recognized the divorce
decrees of sister states on the grounds of comity.21 The Haddock
decision did not foreclose such recognition. Voorhies v. Voorhies22
and Aarnes v. Aarnes28 involved "Reno" divorces. In both cases
the burden was on the person attacking the foreign decree to
prove there was no bona fide residence. The intent to reside per-
manently in Reno was found by the court in both cases. Appar-
ently the decisions in the Williams cases will not preclude Lou-
isiana from following the rule applied in the above cases.
One may safely generalize that, for the time being at least,
a state in which one of the spouses is domiciled is empowered to
issue a valid divorce decree. Such decree will be entitled to full
faith and credit in all states. The question of domicile will de-
pend upon intent to reside permanently in the state that issues
the divorce. The plaintiff's fault in leaving the matrimonial
domicile will have no effect upon the validity of the decree.2 4 Thus
the only time a state court can refuse full faith and credit to a
divorce decree of another state is upon a finding that there was
no bona fide domicile of either spouse in the other state. Since
the state which issued the divorce naturally found a bona fide
domicile, the refusal of another state to recognize the divorce is
subject to review by the United States Supreme Court.
E.P.C.
CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT WITH AN UNLOADED FIREARm-The
defendant, a member of the New Orleans police force, had been
engaged in an argument and fight with a soldier. While in an
intoxicated condition and in pursuit of his adversary, defendant
entered the residence of a third person, pointed his unloaded
revolver at the occupants and pulled the trigger several times
simultaneously demanding, "Where is my man? Tell me where
he is or I will kill you." The defendant was forthwith charged
with and convicted of aggravated assault. In affirming his con-
viction the supreme court took the position most favorable to
21. Aarnes v. Aarnes, 162 La. 648, 135 So. 13 (1931); Voorhies v. Voorhies,
184 La. 406, 166 So. 121 (1936). See Comment (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 96.
22. 184 La. 406, 166 So. 121 (1936).
23. 172 La. 648, 135 So. 13 (1931).
24. "In view of Williams v. North CaroZina, the jurisdictional require-
ment of domicil is freed from confusing refinements about 'matrimonial
domicil.' " C. C. H., 5 U. S. Sup. Ct. Bull. 1495, 1497 (May 21, 1945). Apparently
Haddock v. Haddock is not reinstated by the second Williams Cse,
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the defendant, stating ". . . it will be assumed that the revolver
was not loaded at the time it was pointed and clicked at Mr. and
Mrs. Chantagnier and their guests," and further remarking, "We
shall attempt to determine only the resulting question of law,
namely: Does an assault with an unloaded revolver, under the
circumstances of the case, constitute an assault with a dangerous
weapon?" State v. Johnston, 20 So. (2d) 741 (La. 1944).
A sharp conflict of judicial opinion exists as to whether an
assault is limited to an attempted battery,' or whether it also
contemplates the placing of another in reasonable apprehension
of receiving a battery." Article 36 of the Louisiana Criminal Code
adopted the broad view, stating that "assault is an attempt, to
commit a battery, or the intentional placing of another in reason-
able apprehension of receiving a battery." (Italics supplied). In
conformity with this definition, it constitutes an assault to point
an unloaded gun at another, if the victim is placed in reasonable
apprehension of being shot.
The further question presented in the principal case is
whether an assault with an unloaded gun constitutes an aggra-
vated assault3 or a simple assault. This ultimately depends upon
whether or not the unloaded gun constitutes a "dangerous
"weapon" within the definition of Article 2 of the Louisiana Crim-
inal Code, which adopts the test that the weapon must be such
that "in the manner used [it] is calculated or likely to produce
death or great bodily harm."
1. Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463, 464, 56 Am. R. 42 (1885); Somerville, J.,
delivering the opinion of the court said: "On this question, the adjudged cases,
both in this country, and in England, are not agreed, and a like difference
of opinion prevails among the most learned commentators on the law. We
have had occasion to examine these authorities with some care, on more
occasions than the present; and we are of the opinion that the better view
Is, that presenting an unloaded gun at one who supposes it to be loaded,
although within the distance the gun would carry if loaded, is not, without
more, such an assault as can be punished criminally, although it may sustain
a civil suit for damages. The conflict of authority on this subject is greatly
attributable to a failure to observe the distinction between these two classes
of cases. A civil action would rest upon the invasion of a person's 'right to*
live in society without being put in fear of a personal harm;' and can often
be sustained by proof of a negligent act resulting In unintentional injury.-
Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130, 26 Am. R. 81; Cooley on Torts, 161. An
indictment for the same act could be sustained only upon satisfactory proof
of criminal intention to do personal harm to another by violence."
2. Clark and Marshall, The Law of Crimes (4 ed. 1940) 248, 251, § § 195, 200,
it Is declared that "the better opinion" is to the effect that a reasonable
putting in fear is sufficient to constitute a criminal assault, and that the
actual intent and ability to commit the threatened battery are not necessary.
3. Art. 37, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "Aggravated assault is an assault
c)Mnitted with a dangeroue weapon."
1945]
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After posing this question, and citing the controlling articles
of the Criminal Code' the court proceeded to analyze the case
from the standpoint of the victim's apprehension, stating that
the assaulted could assume that the gun would fire. "Clearly,"
said the court, "the revolver, under these circumstances or in
the manner that it was used by defendant, was likely to produce,
at least, great bodily harm to those assaulted. It, therefore, was
a dangerous weapon."" This statement, however, is not com-
pletely accurate. Under the assumption that the court postulated,
namely, that the pistol was not loaded,' the revolver was not
used by the defendant in a manner which was likely to produce
great bodily harm to those assaulted. Empty pistols do no harm
unless used as a bludgeon, and the evidence does not disclose
that there was any attempt to so use the revolver in question.
Article 2 of the Louisiana Criminal Code defines a dangerous
weapon as including "any gas, liquid or other substance or instru-
mentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to
produce death or great bodily harm." What manner of use, then,
was made of the pistol? It was empty; defendant only pointed
the revolver at the assaulted and clicked it. According to the use
made of the revolver it was not calculated or likely to produce
death or great bodily harm. Giving the statute a strict interpre-
tation, as must be done in criminal cases, an unloaded revolver
is not a "dangerous weapon." The criterion for determining what
is a dangerous weapon is the actual nature of the weapon in the
manner used, and not the apprehension created in the mind of
the assaulted. If the latter had been intended, Article 2 of the
Criminal Code would have been phrased "or instrumentality,
which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely, or appears to
the person assaulted to be calculated or likely, to produce death
or great bodily harm." The notion which the victim entertains
with reference to the qualities of the instrument in the manner
used does not alter its actual character or potentialities for harm.
.If the reasoning of the Louisiana court is carried to its ultimate
conclusion, then it should also constitute an aggravated assault
where one points a toy gun or a stick of wood at another in a
4. Arts. 2, 36, 37, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
5. State v. Johnston, 20 So.(2d) 741, 744 (La. 1944).
.6. Id. at 743. Possibly when the court made the statement in question it
was impressed with the district judge's opinion that the revolver was loaded
when the assault was committed and subconsciously gave some weight to
the fact that the gun might have actually been loaded when the assault was
committed.
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menacing manner, provided the latter thinks that he is in danger
of being shot. An unloaded revolver used in such a manner as
it was in the principal case does not meet the test of being
"calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm."
Under the express provision of Article 367 one may advert to
the apprehension created in the mind of the victim in determining
whether an assault has been committed; but an aggravated
assault requires two indispensable elements. It is an assault plus
the use of a dangerous weapon. The former may be either objec-
tive or subjective; whereas, the latter is solely objective, since
the Criminal Code specifically enumerates the attributes of a
dangerous weapon. Failure to prove the use of a dangerous
weapon, consistently with the definition in Article 2 of the Crim-
inal Code, must necessarily preclude conviction for an aggravated
assault.
In adopting the opinion of the district court, in further justi-
fying its decision, the supreme court quoted, "The complainants,
in order to repel their assailant, would have been justified if they
had either inflicted great bodily harm upon him or slain him,
because it was reasonable for them to believe that their lives
were placed in dange by the conduct of the defendant." How-
ever, the right of self-defense which the defendant's act vested in
his victims is based upon apparent danger' and is not necessarily
indicative of the actual character of a weapon in the manner
used. It is one thing to say that the weapon, as used, created a
reasonable apprehension of danger in the victim's mind, so as to
give him a right of self-defense. It is quite another to say that
the weapon was actually "dangerous" within the meaning of
Article 2 of the Criminal Code.
In Price v. United StatesO a federal circuit court declared that
"The use of a dangerous weapon is what distinguishes the crime
of an assault with a dangerous weapon from a simple assault. A
dangerous weapon 'is one likely to produce death or great bodily
injury.' Or perhaps it is more accurately described as a weapon
which in the manner in which it is used or attempted to be used
may endanger life or inflict great bodily harm. And it is perfectly
clear that an unloaded pistol, when used in the manner shown by
7. Art. 36, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
8. Art. 20, La. Crim. Code of 1942. In view of the fact that the sole basis
of self defense are subjective appearances, it is at once palpable that to
interpret this article so as to impart constructively dangerous characteristics
to the instrument used is logically spurious and renders Article 2, which
defines what a "dangerous weapon" may be, absolutely nugatory.
9. 156 Fed. 950 (C.C.A, 9th, 1907).
19451
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. VI
the evidence in this case, is not, in fact, a dangerous weapon." 10
Other decisions in point1' are also at variance with our Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision in the Johnston case.
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an unloaded
gun did not constitute a "dangerous weapon,"'12 the legislative
body of that state enacted a statute' which expressly stated that
an assault with a firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, would
constitute an aggravated assault. If it is socially desirable, be-
cause of the serious disturbance of the peace which may result,1
that the person who threatens another with an unloaded firearm
be held for an aggravated assault, then it is submitted that the
remedy should be by direct legislative action, rather than by a
judicial interpretation which involves an abandonment of the
general rule that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed
in favor of the accused.
J.M.S.
CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCE-METHOD OF EXECUTION-The de-
fendant was tried and convicted of murder. On August 8, 1940,.
the judge sentenced him to death "by hanging by the neck until
dead." When the transcript of the proceedings was sent to the
Governor to have the date of execution fixed, the defendant, al-
leging that he could not be hanged because Article 569 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure had been repealed by Act 14 of
1940,1 and that the latter statute would be ex post facto if applied
10. Id. at 952.
11. Territory of Arizona v. Gomes, 14 Ariz. 139, 125 Pac. 702 (1912);
People v. Sylva, 143 Cal. 62, 76 Pac. 814 (1904); People v. Montgomery, 15
Cal. App. 315, 114 Pac. 792 (1911); State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625
(1889). In State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113 (1870), a threat with an unloaded
firearm was held not to constitute an assault under a statute defining an
assault to be "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to com-
mit a violent injury upon the person of another."
12. Luitze v. State, 204 Wis. 78, 234 N.W. 382 (1931). In this case the
assailant pointed an unloaded revolver at another. The question of law to be
decided was whether this constituted an assault with a dangerous weapon.
The court held that this was not an assault with a dangerous weapon, no
matter how much the person at whom it was pointed may have been
put in fear.
13. Wis. Stats. (1935) § 340.40.
14. In view of the strain which was placed upon the context of the
controlling articles in the principal case, it may be safely inferred that the
court is of the opinion that serious disturbance of the peace is very likely to
result from such an assault. The writer concurs in this opinion. It is a not
too uncertain likelihood that a victim may suffer serious mental pain and
injury. And in cases where the victim has a weak heart, his life may be
endangered 'or his condition aggravated.
1. Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) Artp. 569-570.
